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Notes: Iran-contra Affair Investigation, July 15-16
by Deborah Tyroler
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Published: Wednesday, July 22, 1987
July 15: An Israeli offer to supply arms to the Nicaraguan contras is one of the secret initiatives
described in the memo that triggered a dispute this week over whether President Reagan had been
told that profits from the Iranian arms sales were used to finance covert operations. In a heavily
edited, unclassified version of the Sept. 15, 1986, memo, Lt. Col. Oliver North asked then-national
security adviser John M. Poindexter to brief Reagan about "initiatives" contained in a classified
attachment. Next to the word "approve," are Poindexter's initials and the notation "Done." Jim
Hershberg, an analyst for the National Security Archive, a private research group, compared the
heavily edited attachment released by the committees with a more complete version printed in
the Tower review panel's report, which showed that one of the "initiatives" was the Israeli offer of
arms to the contras. Hershberg made his research available to WASHINGTON POST. Computer
messages between Poindexter and North indicate that Poindexter approved North's plan to have
the weapons shipped by the private Iran-contra supply network headed by retired Air Force major
general Richard Secord. The Secord operation was financed primarily with profits from the Iranian
arms sales. The link between Iranian arms proceeds and the "initiatives" cited in the memo was
made by North. The fired National Security Council aide testified that the "initiatives" were to be
financed by profits from the Iranian arms sales. He also testified that covert initiatives he did not
describe were to be carried out jointly by the United States and Israel. North's memo was prepared
for a Sept. 15, 1986, meeting between Reagan and then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. The
documents released by the committees blacked out the portion of the accompanying attachment
that deals with the "initiatives" referred to in the memo. However, a portion of the attachment
was printed last February in the public report released by the Tower review panel. North said
in the attachment that on Sept. 11, 1986, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin had offered "a
significant quantity of captured Soviet bloc arms for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance."
The Tower report does not identify the other covert activities or "initiatives." A Jan. 29 Senate
intelligence committee report also cites North's Sept. 15, 1986, memo and refers to the Israeli arms
offer. The report says then-White House chief of staff Donald T. Regan told the panel he attended
a briefing of the president an hour before the Peres meeting, where it was decided that if Peres
raised the offer of arms to the contras, "the president should `just say thanks.'" Poindexter testified
that he firmly believed the National Security Council (NSC) staff was exempt from congressional
restrictions on US military aid to the Nicaraguan contras and that the NSC staff had become a secret
operational unit overseeing private support to the rebels. Poindexter also said he kept President
Reagan informed in "general terms" of the NSC's contra support activities. He also testified that he
was under the impression that Robert McFarlane, while national security adviser, had authorized
North's activities on behalf of the contras. When he succeeded McFarlane, Poindexter said, he
instructed North to continue the work. The NSC staff "had been running this (contra support)
operation on our own for a long period of time because there was no other alternative in order
to keep the contras alive," Poindexter said. Before the ban, the CIA, with assistance from the
Defense and State departments, had provided military and other aid to the contras as part of the
administration's efforts to oppose the Nicaraguan government. Poindexter said he told Reagan that
a secret airstrip had been constructed in Costa Rica in connection with private efforts to support
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the contras. Other testimony has shown that North directed the building of the airfield as part of
a private operation that he had helped set up to fly arms to the contras inside Nicaragua, and that
the airstrip was built with funds diverted from the secret US-Iran arms sales. Poindexter made the
following points in his testimony: * He never told President Reagan that profits from arms sales to
Iran were used to support the contras but said he believed the president "would have approved
the decision at the time if I had asked him." "I made the decision. I felt that I had the authority to
do it. I thought it was a good idea. I was convinced that the president would, in the end, think it
was a good idea. But I did not want him to be associated with the decision." Poindexter said, under
questioning by Senate counsel Arthur L. Liman, that his motive was to provide Reagan "some future
deniability" that would protect him from "political damage." * Poindexter said he kept Reagan
informed in general terms of the activities of the National Security Council, which he said had
become a secret operational unit for overseeing private support for the contras. His testimony
contradicted Reagan's Jan. 26 assertion to the Tower commission that he "did not know the NSC
staff was engaged in helping the contras." And in asserting that he thought the NSC staff was
exempt from congressional restrictions on aid to the contras, Poindexter's testimony contradicted
that of his NSC predecessor, Robert C. McFarlane, who said July 14 that he believed that the Boland
amendment applied to the NSC staff. * He said Reagan on Dec. 5, 1985, signed a "finding" that,
after the fact, authorized a secret arms-for-hostages deal with Iran. The White House has said that
Reagan cannot remember signing the document, and it has never been found because, as Poindexter
testified, on Nov. 21, 1986, as the scandal was coming to light, he personally tore it up and put
it in a basket of materials to be burned. Poindexter said he destroyed the document "because I
thought it was a significant political embarrassment and I wanted to protect him." * Reagan, who
was tagged by the Tower commission as disengaged, uninformed and a lax manager, was portrayed
by Poindexter as a strong, informed president who knew exactly what he wanted and was willing
to take such great risks to achieve his goals that Poindexter sought to protect him from himself.
At the White House, officials said Poindexter had vindicated Reagan by saying he never told the
president about the diversion of funds to the contras. But they acknowledged that Poindexter's
disclosure that Reagan had signed the memo authorizing the arms- for-hostages swap had damaged
the president and raised "obvious problems...that must be resolved." July 16: Poindexter made the
following points in his testimony: * President Reagan, Attorney General Edwin Meese and former
chief of staff Donald Regan, in their final conversations with Poindexter last November, did not
ask what he knew about the diversion of US-Iran arms sales profits to the contras, and Poindexter
did not explain why he had approved the diversion without telling his colleagues and superior.
Poindexter was forced to resign when the secret diversion scheme was revealed. According to
Poindexter, Reagan said that "he had great regret, and that this was in the tradition of a naval officer,
of accepting responsibility." This testimony was in sharp contrast with the account of the president's
reaction given by the White House. A White House spokesman said Reagan was very angry about
the alleged approval of the diversion without checking with him first. [Poindexter's account raised
further questions about whether the White House was interested in getting to the bottom of the
affair. Poindexter's alleged penchant for withholding information and acting on his own increased
skepticism about the Admiral's credibility. "I just don't believe what he says," said Rep. Louis Stokes
(D-Ohio). Stokes said he was particularly doubtful that he never told Reagan about the diversion.
"It does not appear logical that a man of his intellect and management skills would arrogate unto
himself the responsibility of making a monumental decision affecting the president." But Rep.
Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill), a staunch Reagan supporter, said: "I distinguish credibility from judgement.
I believe what he says." Hyde added, "Destroying documents is a serious business," referring
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to Poindexter's statement that he had destroyed a presidential "finding" in December 1985 that
approved of the sale of Hawks to Iran, to save Reagan from political embarrassment.] * Poindexter
testified that the president never gave "a specific designation" for North and others on the NSC
to support the contras. But, he said, "If you take the totality of the president's actions, that was
clearly his intent." * About his "Well done" to North after North had misled the House Intelligence
committee about his involvement in helping the contras, Poindexter said: "Our objective here all
along was to withhold information. There's no question about that." * He said that he knew that
chronologies provided to Congress on the Iran weapons sales were "inaccurate." He also said that
he gave North orders to "specifically" leave out reference to the diversion of funds. * Poindexter
charged that the press and Congress had blown the Iran-contra affair "all out of proportion."
"With hindsight," he added, it would have been better if he had not "resigned when I did." * He
destroyed documents and took no steps to prevent Lt. Col. Oliver North from destroying a notebook
that was relevant to Meese's inquiry, hinted that other documents should be done away with and
admitted that his objective was to "withhold information from Congress." [The admission that he
destroyed evidence raises questions about whether Poindexter obstructed justice or participated
in a criminal conspiracy. According to legal experts, the crucial question is whether at the time he
destroyed a signed presidential "finding" he knew there was a criminal investigation under way and
acted with intent to impede it. Poindexter's testimony also left listeners wondering how plausible
is the "plausible deniability" he said he intended to give Reagan by destroying the "finding."] *
Poindexter, contradicting North, said he did not recall North asking him on Nov. 21 whether Reagan
had been told of the diversion to aid the contras, which had begun the previous February. North
testified that he undertook the diversion assuming from conversations with Poindexter that he had
presidential authority and first learned on Nov. 21 that Reagan had not known. * Poindexter was
unaware that a telephone conversation he had with late CIA Director William J. Casey was tape
recorded by a CIA system for overseas communications. Several conversations "pertinent" to the
Iran-contra affair also were taped. Members of the committees investigating the affair said they
have a transcript of the Poindexter-Casey call and will release it when it is declassified. Poindexter
testified that he called Casey, who was traveling in Central America, and asked him to return to
Washington so he could help explain to Congress the administration's secret Iran arms sales. (Basic
data from several reports by WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK TIMES, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE)

-- End --
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